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WHO'S AFRAID OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION?
Burt Neuborne*
I. Introduction
An essay in honor of the fortieth anniversary of the New York
City Commission on Human Rights (the "Commission") can take
one of two forms-a celebration of the past or an inquiry into the
future. When the editors of the Symposium asked me to attempt
such an essay, I was sorely tempted to adopt a celebratory tone.
As a past Commissioner' and long-time admirer of the Commission's efforts, I wanted to tell the story of the Commission's often
pathbreaking efforts in support of norms of decency and toleration.
But I decided that an essay basking in past achievements would not
keep faith with the Commission's difficult task. Instead, I have
opted for a critical look at what Human Rights Commissions
should be doing in the next forty years.
My decision to focus on the future is driven by four factors.
First, the factual context in which human rights cases tend to arise,
these days is quite different from the factual context of forty years
ago. Forty years ago, bigotry was blatant and open. Refusals to
hire, rent or associate with one or another racial, religious, gender
or ethnic group were proudly trumpeted as badges of honor and, in
many jurisdictions, as formal governmental policy. Adjudication in
those "first generation" cases consisted of applying norms of decency to relatively uncontested, egregious factual settings. It is
sadly true, of course, that overt bigotry has continued into our day.
But, increasingly, human rights cases arise in more complex factual
settings requiring far more resources to adjudicate fairly. Because
intentional discrimination is rarely acknowledged in today's society, difficult questions of fact are common in most cases. Relying
on an adversary hearing process to resolve complex factual questions, while an excellent guarantee of procedural fairness, is enormously expensive and far from fool-proof. Adjudicating a human
rights case is now such an unpredictable, resource intensive event
* John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. I was appointed to the Commission in 1988 by then-Mayor Koch and served
for two years as a holdover in the Dinkins administration. My first appearance before
the Commission was in the late 1960's, in a case challenging the hiring practices of the
New York Philharmonic.
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that the question, whether scarce enforcement resources can be
more effectively deployed, inevitably arises.
Second, unlike the world of forty years ago, Human Rights Commissions are no longer the only, or even necessarily, the most effective, human rights enforcement game in town. In the past halfcentury, an enormous body of constitutional, statutory and common law has evolved in the area of human rights. Not surprisingly,
a public interest bar has evolved in symbiotic tandem with the complex law, aided by statutory fee shifting provisions. Much of the
enforcement responsibility in human rights cases is now centered in
the courts. Whether an adjudicative process in the Human Rights
Commission that mirrors the judicial process is the best method of
organizing Commission enforcement efforts is now a real question.
Third, we live in an era of shrinking governmental resources. I
have no doubt that Human Rights Commissions will absorb more
than their fair share of government cutbacks. In times of plenty,
perhaps it would be possible to pursue multiple enforcement strategies, secure in the knowledge that each would be adequately
funded. In the years to come, though, careful thought must be
given to the best use of an increasingly scarce national resourcethe enforcement capability of Human Rights Commissions.
Finally, the complexity and moral difficulty of third and fourth
generation human rights issues has clouded the public's level of
support for the underlying norm of equality itself. In first generation human rights cases, where bigotry is blatant, the vast bulk of
American society rallies to a norm of decency. As issues get more
complex, especially when effective remedies will cause real pain to
many, support tends to erode for human rights. Rather than
plunge headlong into that maelstrom, Human Rights Commissions
may have other important roles to play in enforcing human rights.
Driven by those factors, I want to pose a single, fundamental
question about Commission enforcement efforts in the years to
come: To what extent should the Commission focus on remedying
past acts of discrimination, or concentrate on preventing future
acts from occurring? As I hope to demonstrate, while the two functions are compatible, serious choices must be made between the
two approaches.
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The Pre-Event and Post-Event Functions of Law

In his classic effort to explain Erie v. Tompkins,2 Justice Harlan

reminded us that we ask at least two things of law.3 First, we ask

that law provide us with a means of dealing with unacceptable behavior that has already taken place. Whether by punishing the offender, compensating the victim, or both, we look to "post-event"
law to provide a sense of closure by restoring the balance of a universe disturbed by an untoward act. Indeed, what we call "justice"

in a particular case is often an intuitive belief that the balance disturbed by an untoward act has been restored by the imposition of

an appropriate legal sanction. When, however, post-event sanctions appear disproportionately high4 or low 5 or wildly erratic, 6 or
when compensation seems inadequate7 or a windfall,8 law does not
fulfill its post-event function. Instead of delivering closure, it sends
2. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Erie held that federal judges in diversity cases lacked power
to generate federal common law. Id. at 78.
3. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan argued that Erie called for the application of state law in federal diversity cases only when application of the federal norm might affect pre-event behavior
or cause unfair post-event consequences. Id. at 475. Justice Harlan used the phrase
"primary activity" to describe pre-event behavior.
Justice Harlan's elegant explanation of Erie,while a favorite of academics, has been
overtaken by the "presumptively procedural" test set forth in Chief Justice Warren's
majority opinion in Hanna, establishing a presumption that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure displace state norms in federal diversity cases. As with other nationalizing
principles of the Warren era, the "presumptively procedural" test may be in for rethinking. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (applying state law);
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987) (applying federal law); Stewart
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (applying federal law).
4. When punishment becomes wildly disproportionate, it triggers the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines. Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (rejecting capital punishment for rape); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (rejecting capital punishment in absence of participation in
death); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (affirming reversal of "recidivist" life
sentence for minor offense).
5. Inadequate legal sanction does not, ordinarily, give rise to legal redress, except
when compensatory damages are woefully inadequate or when punitive damages are
wrongfully withheld. Indeed, the Double Jeopardy Clause is designed to assure that
the government does not take a second bite in an effort to increase punishment perceived as inadequate. Historically, the sense of injustice created by punishments perceived as inadequate has given rise to the adoption of mandatory minimum sentences.
6. The unacceptableness of significant disparities in punishment led to the promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
7. For example, the courts failed to provide for mental anguish in pre-1992 Title
VII cases. See, e.g., Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989).
8. In extreme cases, damages that are too high or too low may be altered or set
aside. E.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,
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the contrary message of continued imbalance that we perceive as
injustice.
Second, we want law to provide a means of guiding human behavior so that untoward events do not occur at all. Whether by
education, 9 bribery, 10 or fear,'1 we look to "pre-event" law as a
means of inducing people to behave in acceptable ways. When,
however, because of need, ignorance, greed or impunity, important
actors ignore pre-event law, all law becomes post-event.
At this point, of course, a natural bridge exists between the preand post-event functions of law: The punishment or compensation
designed to restore a sense of balance and achieve post-event closure serves to frighten people into pre-event compliance. But the
natural bridge is full of potholes.
Perhaps the biggest pothole is the fact that the intense relationship between post-event sanction and pre-event compliance tends
to blot out everything else. Focus shifts to post-event enforcement
activities precisely because they provide the promise of both closure and compliance. Instead of expending significant resources to
alter pre-event behavior by education, inducement or amelioration,
we often drift into a post-event mentality, expending huge sums on
detection, adjudication, collection and human warehousing in the
hope that fear of post-event sanctions will deter unwanted preevent behavior. 2 When obsession with the post-event function of
law goes too far, the result is often disastrous. A perfect example is
the nation's war on drugs, a failed enterprise that pours vast re258 (1951); Cantrell v. Knoxville Community Dev. Corp., 60 F.3d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir.
1995).
9. The most dramatic example of the educational function of law is its role in
supporting the exclusionary rule. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. American Aerial Lift, Inc. v. Perez, 629 So.2d 169, 171 n.3 (3d Dist. Fla. 1993)
(strict liability serves as an incentive to safety); Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex
Corp., 822 F. Supp. 545, 552 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (law serves as an incentive to clean up
hazardous waste), affd in part, rev'd in part,2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1044 (1994); Rosenberg v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 1982 WL 2125 at *2
(Md. Tax Ct.) (assessing a penalty is improper if it serves no legitimate incentive
purpose).
11. See, e.g., State v. Mayo, 915 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Mo. 1996) (sanctions serve as a
deterrent to drunk drivers), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 61 (1996); In re Colorado Springs
Air Crash, 867 F. Supp. 630, 634 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (joint and several liability serves as a
deterrent to corporate defendants).
12. Examples include recent efforts to deal with illegitimacy by cutting off welfare
payments. See Mike Royko, Analyzing the Welfare Debate, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug.
29, 1996; William F. Buckley, Welfare Reform Can Work If It's Tried, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Aug. 5, 1996.
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sources into an effort to stop 13drug use by focusing almost exclusively on post-event sanctions.
As the drug war's failures demonstrate, at least two problems
emerge when post-event law takes over a complex area of human
behavior. First, significant constraints, such as scarce resources, a
sense of proportion, or doubts about the underlying norm itself,
place real-world limits on the extent to which post-event sanctions
can be severe enough to provide the desired level of deterrence. In
practice, reliance on post-event sanctions as an effective deterrent
often proves impossible because detection is too difficult, adjudication is inherently unpredictable, and the required level of punishment is often unacceptably harsh; 14 needless to say, detection,
adjudication, and punishment are all expensive undertakings.
Second, even when sanctions can be ratcheted to the necessary
level, the emergence of Draconian post-event punishments,
whether couched in the form of harsh prison sentences or extremely high compensatory or punitive damages, often inhibits the
emergence of a sense of closure. Lack of closure leaves open the
perception of imbalance that we call injustice and raises doubts
about the legitimacy of the underlying legal norms themselves.
Fear of Draconian sanctions may also provoke unwanted behavior
designed to avoid even the possibility of a violation.
In short, what appears at first glance to be a natural symbiosis
between pre- and post-event law, is often quite the opposite. The
very effort to use post-event sanctions to achieve pre-event ends
often winds up distorting both. Witness the war against drugs,
where the effort to use post-event sanctions as the primary means
of altering pre-event behavior has led to a distortion of law enforcement priorities, an explosion in the prison population, a perception of unjust sentencing and enforcement, and the expenditure
of staggering sums-all without making a serious dent in the nation's drug problem.
Despite the demonstrated weakness of over-dependence on
post-event punishment as a means of altering pre-event behavior,
13. For excerpts from the debates on drug laws, see, e.g., Robert B. Charles, Back
to the Future: The Collapse of National Drug Control Policy and a Blueprintfor Revitalizing the Nation's CounternarcoticsEffort, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 339 (1996); Terry
J. Hatter, Jr., Drugs and the Law: "Wargames", 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 89 (1995); Carl

Tobias, ParticipantCompensation in the Clinton Administration,27 CONN. L. REV. 563
(1995); Rick Fueyo, Note, Normative Considerations of Asset Forfeiture Under the
Drug Abuse Control Act, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143 (1995).

14. I will argue that these constraints are particularly powerful when we seek to
enforce human rights norms, both in the courts and in Human Rights Commissions.
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the technique is supported by two powerful constituencies: victims;
and the bureaucracy needed to administer a post-event process.
Victims naturally want (and often deserve) generous compensation
and/or the sense that their tormentors have been severely punished. Moreover, to the extent that deterrence (and disablement)
is actually effected by strong sanctions, the number of future victims is diminished..
The often legitimate victim-centered case for a strong post-event
system of law is reinforced by the self-interest of the bureaucracy
needed to operate it. Detection personnel, the apparatus of adjudication, including lawyers, and the agencies of enforcement and
detention, coupled with the inherent strength of the desire to restore a lost sense of balance, create a potent tide that sweeps us
toward a post-event approach to difficult issues of law. The failed
war on drugs is only the most obvious example.
Enforcement of human rights norms, especially by specialized
Human Rights Commissions, risks being caught up in the postevent tide. Increasingly, the attention and resources of the human
rights enforcement community is being devoted to post-event
remediation in an understandable effort both to compensate a few
randomly selected victims and to frighten the general population
into widespread compliance. I fear that Human Rights Commissions risk evolving into the human rights police, with the same law
enforcement mentality and the same tendency to fixate on postevent sanctions at the expense of pre-event efforts. I hope to point
out the very difficult hurdles that a post-event model of human
rights enforcement must overcome in order to achieve pre-event
success and to suggest two practical techniques for strengthening
post-event enforcement by Human Rights Commissions, while
placing increasing emphasis on pre-event approaches.
In large part, this article is driven by the extremely limited enforcement resources available to the human rights enforcement
community in general, and the nation's Human Rights Commissions in particular. In a world of unlimited resources, perhaps the
human rights enforcement community could pursue an aggressive
post-event strategy, and couple it with powerful pre-event activity.
In the real world, though, we must make painful choices about
available resources. My broad question is, with particular emphasis on the resources available to Human Rights Commissions, to
what extent should human rights enforcement resources be devoted to post-event remediation, or to pre-event compliance?
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In order to narrow the discussion, I will concentrate on a single
recurring issue, both because it is intrinsically important, and because it is a microcosm of the larger question: What approach
should the human rights enforcement community take to deriva-

tive (often entity) employer liability for employee violations of
human rights norms? Driven by traditional post-event concerns of
compensation and deterrence, the human rights bar has understandably attempted to impose classic respondeat superiorliability

on employers for human rights violations committed by employees.
The legal fallout of the strategy has been uneven. As we shall see,
the rules governing derivative employer liability for human rights
violations are hopelessly confused, whether in the area of violations committed under color of law, or private violations. Moreover, the practical consequences of the post-event strategy have

been unfortunate. Instead of: (1) focusing credible sanctions on
the individuals who actually commit the violations; and (2) rewarding employers who make genuine efforts to prevent human
rights violations, the strategy has tended to seek a "deep pocket"

entity-defendant capable of paying a large judgment, often ignoring the real culprit and paying no attention to the moral blamewor-

thiness of the employer. Since in most cases (especially Human
Rights Commission cases) the compensatory award is not nearly
large enough to induce an employer to make fundamental struc-

tural changes, 5 the principal effect of respondeat superiorliability

has been to free a guilty actor from any direct financial consequences.1 6 While the occasional large respondeat superior award
may bring welcome relief to a randomly selected victim, it often
15. Awards in human rights cases tend to lag behind damages in tort and contract
cases. For example, compare the jury verdict in Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants,
1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. Ct. 1994) (awarding $2.86 million to woman scalded by
hot coffee), with the $450,000 award granted by the Commission in Ruiz v. Arcade
Cleaning Corp., Compl. No. EM00465-08/29/88, Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Feb. 28,
1995) (observing, in sexual harassment case, that "[n]o case has ever been brought to
trial before this tribunal involving the level of abusive conduct found here"). Lacking
power to award punitive damages, the Commission will rarely be able to make an
award large enough to force an alteration in employer behavior. Occasional large
awards by juries in Section 1983 or Title VII cases may force changes in behavior, but
they are few and far between. Moreover, we may not like the new behavior any more
than the old.
16. Of course, once an employer satisfies a respondeat superiorjudgment, it may
recover over against the employee. In my experience, though, efforts to recover over
are very rare. Either the employee is too valuable to offend, the employer does not
view the violation as morally culpable, or the transaction costs of additional litigation
are not worth the effort. Rather than seek to recover over, the employer will, more
likely, dismiss the offending employee.
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bypasses the truly guilty party, risks harming innocent persons, and
sends a blurred message to an employer without providing much
pre-event guidance.
Under a post-event respondeat superior approach, only Draconian awards can apply enough pressure to force most employers to
act in a way that will have much pre-event effect. But truly Draconian awards are unlikely and, often, unfair. And, even when they
occur, they are often as likely to provoke unacceptable alternatives
as the desired ones. If the award is large enough to hurt, its pain
will often be felt by innocent persons (co-employees, consumers,
stockholders and taxpayers) who had nothing to do with the
human rights violation. At that point, a rational employer will ask
how to avoid similar pain in the future. Avoiding minority employees entirely is one unacceptable extreme. A quota system is the
other. Adoption of careful preventive measures, such as thorough
training programs and effective grievance procedures, is the obviously preferred alternative. But respondeat superior liability in
human rights cases does nothing to reward an employer for adopting the preferred approach.
I will argue that focus should be shifted from the traditional
post-event preoccupation with respondeat superior liability in
human rights cases to two approaches designed to reward effective
preventive behavior, while maximizing the deterrent effect of a
Commission's award. First, I would focus primary financial responsibility on the person who actually commits the human rights violation. From the dual standpoints of deterrence and moral
responsibility, the guilty actor in a human rights drama should pay
the financial price of restoring a sense of balance. Only after the
financial resources of the guilty individuals have been exhausted
would I look to the entity employer. At that point, I would give
the employer a choice. In the absence of an effective preventive
plan, I would impose strict respondeat superior liability, relying on
Draconian post-event sanctions to induce pre-event compliance.
If, however, an employer had adopted an effective pre-event compliance plan, I would release the employer from liability, in the
absence of proof of actual moral culpability. Finally, rather than
engage in ad hoc determinations of the quality of a preventive
plan, I would shift a portion of the resources of the Human Rights
Commission that are now being spent on post-event remediation to
the task of designing, supervising and certifying preventive human
rights plans established by employers. Only if the Human Rights
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Commission certified a plan's effectiveness, would 17the preventive
safe harbor from respondeat superior liability exist.
III.

Respondeat Superior and the Enforcement of
Human Rights

A.

The Legal Quagmire

The Supreme Court has had only limited success in defining the
appropriate level of liability for an entity that employs someone
found guilty of a human rights violation. The issue generally arises
in one of two contexts: suits against government actors under Section 1983,18 and suits against private actors under Title VII.
1.

Government Liability Under Section 1983

In the modern era, the issue of derivative employer liability first
arose in the context of human rights violations committed by government employees. A plaintiff must overcome three procedural
hurdles to establish liability for damages under Section 1983. First,
the governmental defendant must be deemed a "person" as that
word is used in Section 1983; second, imposition of liability by a
federal court must satisfy federal standards governing the qualified
and absolute immunities of certain categories of government defendants; 19 and, third, the defendant's conduct must be deemed
17. I make two significant caveats about my proposal. First, I am not certain that
my suggestions should necessarily be adopted in settings where victims use private
lawyers to vindicate human rights norms in the courts without the help of a Human
Rights Commission. While I believe that similar arguments can be made in the private
enforcement sphere, my position has particular application to the use of limited enforcement resources available to Human Rights Commissions.
Second, I do not suggest that adequate resources are currently available to Human
Rights Commissions. But, in the real world, I see no likelihood that more resources
will be forthcoming, requiring us to think carefully about how we deploy the enforcement resources available to us.
18. Two methods exist to enforce constitutional norms against the government.
Most claims against state or local government are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in either state or federal court. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The
Supreme Court has recognized, as well, a cause of action springing directly from the
Constitution that can provide relief against the federal government. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). I
assume that the same derivative liability rules apply to both causes of action. It is
possible, however, that Bivens claims may be governed by different rules.
19. Significantly, a finding of qualified immunity for an employee does not immunize the employer from liability, if the other requisites exist. Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986), citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982).

1148

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII

sufficiently culpable to warrant imposing fault-based liability under

a statutory gloss imposed by the Supreme Court.
a. Who or What is a "Person" Under Section 1983?
Any flesh and blood defendant sued in an "individual" capacity

is a 1983 "person."20 The personal damage liability of such an "individual" defendant is determined by the interplay of the qualified
immunity and good faith defense issues discussed below. 21 Suits

against local officials sued in their "official" 22capacities are treated
as suits against the government entity itself.
Until 1978, all governmental entities were excluded from the
term "person." In Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.,23 the Supreme
Court ruled that local government entities were "persons" within
the meaning of the statute, but declined to impose respondeatsuperior liability for damages. Instead, the Court ruled that local governmental entities were liable as "persons" under Section 1983
only for acts taken pursuant to "policy or custom."24 During the
1988 Term, the Court ruled that state governmental entities were
not "persons" under 1983 because Congress did not intend, in
1871, to impose monetary liability on states in light of the Eleventh
Amendment. The Court had already held in Quern v. Jordan2 6

that Congress did not intend to override the Eleventh Amendment
by enacting Section 1983. The curious result of the interplay between Quern and Will is that states can be sued under 1983 in both
20. E.g., Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961). Whether a flesh and blood defendant sued in an "official" capacity is a "person" depends upon the employing agency and the relief sought. Employees of local
governmental units sued in an official capacity are "persons" no matter what relief is
sought. Brandon, 469 U.S. at 472. Employees of state governmental units sued in an
official capacity are "persons" only to the extent that prospective injunctive relief is
sought. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 n.10 (1989). A state employee sued in an official capacity for damages under Section 1983 is not a "person."
For the purposes of determining liability, a suit against a defendant in an official capacity is deemed to be an action against the government entity itself. Id. at 71.
21. See infra Part III.A.l.b.
22. Under current ground rules, a Section 1983 case for damages cannot be
brought in state or federal court against a state official sued in an "official" (as opposed to an "individual") capacity. Will, 496 U.S. at 66, 71. Whether the same constraints would apply to a Bivens claim founded directly on the constitution has not
been explored. The Court's narrow construction of the term "person" in Will may reawaken the attempt to develop parallel Bivens claims free from a restrictive construction of Section 1983.
23. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
24. Id. at 690.
25. Will, 491 U.S. at 64.
26. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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state and federal court for prospective injunctive relief, if the plaintiff is careful to name an appropriate flesh and blood state defendant in an individual capacity; but states may not be sued for
damages under 1983 in state court even though no Eleventh
Amendment issue would be raised.
b.

Who or What is Immune From Liability Under Section 1983?

The Supreme Court has held that the passage of Section 1983 in
1871 was not intended to abrogate traditional common law immunities or to override Eleventh Amendment immunity. 28 In approaching the surviving common law immunities, three points
should be stressed. First, the Court's approach to immunity in recent years has been relentlessly functional. Mystical arguments
about the inherent existence of immunities, or emotional arguments about the inherent unfairness of all immunities, get short
shrift. Second, immunities (other than legislative immunity) ordinarily apply only to damage awards, generally leaving a 1983 court
free to issue injunctive relief and to award attorneys fees. Third, a
common law immunity should be distinguished from its cousin, the
good faith defense, 29 which is a fact-based affirmative defense.
Section 1983 immunities come in five flavors: judicial; legislative;
executive; sovereign; and Eleventh Amendment.
Judicial Immunity
Judges and executive officials performing adjudicative tasks
(such as administrative law judges) are immune from damage liability arising out of the performance of their adjudicative functions,
even if they perform the functions in bad faith. 30 However, since
the immunity is functionally based, judges are entitled to no immunity for acts performed outside their adjudicative capacity. Thus,
in Forrester v. White,3 the Court held that judicial immunity did
not attach to a judge's allegedly discriminatory personnel decisions.
27. State law on issues like sovereign immunity, respondeat superiorand suability

is overridden by federal standards in Section 1983 cases. Martinez v. California, 444
U.S. 277 (1980).
28. E.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (holding that Section 1983 does not
abrogate common law tort immunities); Quern, 440 U.S. at 341 (explaining that Section 1983 was not intended to override Eleventh Amendment immunity).
29. See infra Part III.A.l.c.

30. E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (administrative hearing officer
immunity); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judicial immunity); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial immunity).
31. 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
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Lower courts have respected the limitation. 32 Moreover, in Pulliam v. Allen,3 3 the Court ruled that judicial immunity did not apply

to actions for prospective injunctive relief, or to statutory attorneys
fees awarded in connection with the issuance of injunctive relief
against a judge.
The functional nature of judicial immunity has led to its extension to non-judicial participants in the justice system who are nec-

essary to the proper functioning of the process. Thus, prosecuting
attorneys enjoy a quasi-judicial immunity for acts arising out of the
actual prosecution of a case; 34 however, there is no immunity for

acts taken in an investigatory capacity. Similarly, prosecution
witnesses are immune from damage actions for perjury. 36 In contrast, court-appointed defense lawyers are not immune from state
law malpractice liability or federal Section 1983 claims for conspir-

ing with the prosecutor.37 State police officials are not entitled to
absolute immunity in connection with applications for search warrants;38 nor are members of a federal prison disciplinary committee.39 Members of parole boards are probably immune from claims
arising out of their adjudicatory functions, but may be liable for
administrative decisions.4 0 The lower courts are divided on
whether persons who initiate social service petitions in custody sit-

uations enjoy absolute immunity.4

32. E.g., Archie v. Lanier, 95 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 1996) (denying immunity to state
court judge accused of stalking and sexually assaulting a litigant); Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that judge was not entitled to judicial immunity for promulgation of an "English-only" rule), vacated as moot, 490 U.S.
1016 (1989).
33. 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
34. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
35. E.g., Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part, 446
U.S. 754 (1980).
36. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
37. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984).
Section 1983 claims against defense lawyers should be quite rare, though, since the
Court has ruled that they do not act under color of law in the performance of their
duties. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
38. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
39. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 195 (1985).
40. Compare Johnson v. Rhode Island Parole Board Members, 815 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.
1987)(holding that parole board officials are entitled to absolute immunity regardless
of whether their duties are administrative or adjudicatory), with Harper v. Jeffries,
808 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1986)(granting immunity to parole board official performing a
"plainly adjudicatory function").
41. Compare Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456 (6th Cir. 1984)(holding that employees of the Department of Social Services were entitled to absolute immunity regardless of knowledge), with Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d
782 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that supervisory personnel could be liable under § 1983
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Legislative Immunity
Unlike judicial immunity, which applies only to damage liability,
legislative immunity, which derives from the "Speech or Debate"
clause of the federal constitution for federal legislators and common law immunity for state legislators, shields the legislative process from any interference by the courts, either in the form of
injunctions or damages. While it is theoretically possible to imagine differences between federal and state versions of the immunity,
the Supreme Court has treated them as essentially coterminous.42
Like judicial immunity, the Court has applied a rigorous functional
test to measure both the scope of the immunity and the identities
of persons who may assert it. In Gravel v. United States, 43 the
Court ruled that the immunity was available to staff members who
were working on core legislative activities. The correlative was recognized in Davis v. Passman,4 where the Court held that legislative immunity did not apply to discriminatory personnel decisions
made by a member of Congress because those decisions were not
part of the legislative process. 45 One curious distinction between
state and federal immunity involves the admissibility of legislative
acts in criminal prosecutions against legislators, generally for bribery. The Supreme Court has held that the "Speech or Debate"
clause renders legislative acts inadmissible in prosecutions against
members of Congress, but that state immunity does not render
such acts inadmissible in a federal prosecution of a state legislative
officer.46
for exhibiting "deliberate indifference" to injury), cert. denied sub nom. Catholic
Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).

42. See Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
43. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
44. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).

45. Id. at 246. Acts like arranging for the private publication of the Pentagon
Papers, arranging for the public dissemination of embarrassing committee material,
publishing newsletters and press releases have been held to fall outside the scope of

the immunity. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); Doe v. McMillan, 412
U.S. 306 (1973); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). Voting, speeches on
the floor of Congress and the holding of committee hearings, including the exercise of

the subpoena power, have been deemed covered by the privilege. See, e.g., Eastland
v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
46. Compare United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979)(holding evidence of a
former Congressman's past legislative acts inadmissible in prosecution for bribery of
public officials), with United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980)(admitting evidence
against state legislator).
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Legislative immunity applies to the acts of regional and, presumably, local legislators.47 However, a key distinction exists between
the immunity granted to an agency to enunciate new rules, which is
protected by legislative immunity, and the agency's attempt to enforce the rules, which is deemed an administrative act and, thus,
outside the immunity. Consequently, in Supreme Court v. Consumers Union,48 the Supreme Court of Virginia was deemed to be
acting in its immune legislative capacity when it enacted new rules
governing attorney conduct, but lost its legislative immunity the
moment it sought to enforce the new rules.
Executive Immunity

Executive officials are never immune from injunctive relief.
Courts have been extremely cautious in extending absolute damage immunity to executive officials. The President is absolutely immune from damage liability for official acts taken while in office.49
A small group of Presidential aides may share Presidential immunity, but the Attorney General, members of the cabinet, governors
and National Guard officials are not entitled to absolute damage
immunity.50
To the extent that members of the executive branch are insulated
from damages under Section 1983, the insulation flows from notions of
qualified immunity and good faith defense discussed
5
below. '
Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from imposing
retrospective damage liability on states or state officials sued in
their official capacities. It has no application to injunctive relief
premised on a violation of federal, as opposed to state, law. 2 Nor
does the Eleventh Amendment have any application to suits
against local governmental units, such as municipalities, counties or
47. E.g., Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
48. 446 U.S. 719 (1980).
49. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
50. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511

(1985).
nates.
51.
52.
(1974);

Military officers are immune from intra-service damage actions by subordiChappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
See infra Part III.A.1.c.
E.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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school boards.53 Unique among constitutional provisions, the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity can be overridden by Congress when it legislates pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment or
the Commerce Clause. 54 The Court has explicitly refused to read
Section 1983 as intended to override Eleventh Amendment immunity,55 reasoning that, in 1871, Eleventh Amendment considerations led Congress to eliminate states from the coverage of the
word "person" in Section 1983.56 The Court, at one time, used an
energized concept of implied or constructive waiver to limit Eleventh Amendment immunity.57 In recent years, however, the Court
has demanded a clear statement of an intent to waive.58 Similarly,
the Court now requires strong evidence of a clear Congressional
intent to override the Eleventh Amendment. 59 In Hutto v. Finney,6 ° the Court ruled that Section 1988 authorized the award of
attorneys' fees against states, despite the Eleventh Amendment;
and in Missouri v. Jenkins,6 1 the Court applied Hutto to the award

of an enhanced fee to reflect delay in payment. In Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,62 the Court complicated litigation
against state entities by ruling that the Eleventh Amendment bars
federal courts from issuing injunctive relief against a state official
to redress the violation of a pendent state claim. Thus, litigators
seeking to raise both state and federal claims against state defendants are put to a difficult choice, because the federal forum will
often be unable to act on the pendent state claim. The alternatives
are to forego the federal forum or to file two actions, with the attendant inefficiency and preclusion risks.
Sovereign Immunity
It is unclear whether the Eleventh Amendment is intended to
codify state sovereign immunity or whether judge-made common
53. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
54. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)(noting that the extension of Title VII
to states overrides the Eleventh Amendment); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. i (1989)(stating that environmental legislation overrides the Eleventh
Amendment).
55. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
56. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
57. E.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by Welch v. Texas
Dep't of Highways, 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
58. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
59. E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985).
60. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
61. 491 U.S. 274 (1989).
62. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
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law sovereign immunity continues in tandem with the Eleventh
Amendment. Whatever the doctrinal formulation, the following
two principles seem clear: state immunity law cannot prevent recovery under Section 1983 if federal standards are satisfied, and the
Supreme Court's approach to sovereign immunity law is likely to
be rigorously functional in the future. Thus in Westfall v. Ervin,63
the Court rewrote traditional intergovernmental tort immunity to
eliminate federal sovereign immunity from state tort actions for all
federal "ministerial" as opposed to "policy-making" activity.
c.

What Level of Fault Is Required in Order to Impose Damage
Liability Under Section 1983?

When injunctive relief is sought under Section 1983, the sole
question is whether the defendants are in violation of law and if so,
whether an injunction is necessary to put an end to the violation.
The "objective reasonableness" of the defendants' illegal behavior
and the place in the employment hierarchy of the unlawful actor
are, ordinarily, irrelevant when prospective relief is at issue.
When, however, damages are sought, the Court has enunciated
an elaborate set of rules in Section 1983 cases designed to allocate
loss among the plaintiff, the individual defendant, and the government entity defendant. Briefly summarized, the rules provide that
losses caused by an illegal "policy or custom" of the government
entity should be borne by the government entity,64 losses caused by
the illegal acts of a government employee that were performed in
the absence of a "policy or custom" should be borne by the erring
employee, 65 and if the employee can establish that the acts were
committed under an "objectively reasonable" belief that they were
lawful, the loss falls on the plaintiff.66
In many cases, the illegal acts giving rise to a Section 1983 claim
are obviously the work of a "bad apple," acting in clear violation of
both federal and local law. In those settings, the Court's scheme
allocates loss to the potentially judgment-proof "bad apple" because the government entity has been guilty of nothing, except hiring a "bad apple." Enormous resources are often expended in
attempting to prove that the government entity failed to take ade63. 484 U.S. 292 (1988).

64. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
65. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-34 (1985).
66. O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 1994); Dartland v.
Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1989).
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quate steps to prevent the misbehavior, usually by failing to train
adequately.
In many cases, the "objectively reasonable" belief in legality will
have been created by the existence of a "policy or custom" of the
government employer. Under those circumstances, the Court's
system works beautifully to shift liability from an employee who
was only doing his job to the government entity that is truly responsible for the loss.
When, however, no obvious "custom or policy" exists and the
erring employee satisfies the requirement of objectively reasonable
belief of legality, the Court's insistence that damage liability under
Section 1983 be tied to individual or group fault creates a hole in
the remedial scheme that leaves plaintiffs uncompensated, despite
a finding that their constitutional rights have been violated. The
size of the hole depends on the answer to two questions: (1) What
constitutes a "policy or custom" of a government entity; and (2)
What constitutes an "objectively" reasonable belief in legality?
Neither question has been clearly answered by the Court.
What Constitutes a Policy or Custom?
Government entity liability in damages under Section 1983 begins with Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs.67 In Monell, the Supreme Court ruled that municipalities were "persons"
within the meaning of Section 1983, but rejected the imposition of
respondeat superior liability for unconstitutional acts of their employees. Instead, the Court required a showing that the unlawful
act had been done pursuant to a "policy or custom" that made it
just to saddle the community with the consequences of the unlawful act. In Owen v. City of Independence,68 the Court ruled that
once a "policy or custom" had been established, a municipality
could not avoid liability by establishing a derivative good faith defense, based on the good faith of the people who adopted it. Owen
is critical to the Court's loss-allocation scheme, since it makes possible the shift of liability from innocent employees to the municipality without destroying the plaintiff's ability to receive
compensation. The medicine was sweetened by the insulation of
the municipality from any punitive damage liability.69
In the wake of Monell and Owen, courts have struggled with the
concept of "policy or custom." Obviously, formal action by an en67. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
68. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
69. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
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tity constitutes its "policy." Whether action by a high ranking official constitutes policy has badly divided the Court. In Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati,70 the Court ruled that a single decision by a
County Prosecutor to break into a doctor's office constituted the
policy of the County, since he was the highest ranking law enforcement official and had power under local law to formulate policy. In
City of St. Louis v. Prapotnik,7 ' the Court ruled that the transfer
and layoff of a city employee by the head of his department did not
constitute the policy of the City, since the agency head was not
vested with formal authority to make policy under local law.
What is lacking in the fragmented opinions of the Court (there
was no opinion of the Court in Prapotnik)is a sense of the purpose
behind the requirement of "policy or custom." Until a consensus is
reached on what values the "policy or custom" rule is designed to
advance, it will be impossible for the lower courts to enunciate a
principled body of law in the area.
In the absence of a formal policy or an established custom, action by a lower-ranking official will rarely, if ever, trigger entity
liability. Plaintiffs have attempted to fill this void by arguing that
failure to train and failure to supervise lower-level employees can
rise to the level of a policy. In City of Canton v. Harris,7 2 the Court
ruled that a failure to train could be so egregious as to give rise to
Section 1983 liability, if the injury was related to the training deficiency. The Harris Court enunciated a demanding standard, requiring the failure to train to be so egregious as to constitute
"deliberate indifference" to the foreseeable unconstitutional consequences. 73 A similar analysis will probably be followed in the failure to supervise cases, as well.
What Constitutes "Objectively" Reasonable Belief in Legality?
The Court has consistently ruled that, unlike entities, individual
government officials should not be saddled with personal liability
for acts that they reasonably believed to be lawful at the time they
performed them. The concept is often described as a "qualified
immunity" available to executive branch officials, or as a "good
faith defense" available to individual government defendants. The
concept initially had both an objective and a subjective component.
In order to escape liability, a defendant was obliged to prove both
70. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
71. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
72. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).

73. Id. at 390.
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subjective and objective good faith. 74 Such a standard made it virtually impossible for a defendant to avoid a full-scale trial, since
subjective good faith was incapable of resolution on summary judgment. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,75 the Court abandoned the subjective component in favor of an "objectively" reasonable standard.
The critical issue under Harlow is whether, in view of the state of
the law at the time the act took place, the defendant had objectively reasonable grounds for believing the act to have been legal.76
If such objectively reasonable grounds exist, the fact that the act
was a clear breach of state law will not strip the defendant of his
federal immunity, although the defendant may be liable under
state law.77
In Mitchell v. Forsyth,7 8 the Court ruled that to the extent a claim
of qualified immunity rests on an issue of law, it is appealable immediately under 28 U.S.C. 1291, despite the lack of a final judgment. Mitchell is consistent with the desire in Harlow to free
defendants from unnecessary trials. It has generated substantial
confusion, however, since decisions about qualified immunity and
generally involve closely intertwined issues of
good faith defense
79
fact and law.
The bottom line on 1983 liability is decidedly mixed. Injunctive
relief is readily available, providing a potent mechanism for enforcing human rights norms against state and local governments. But
damages are another story. Individual liability is complicated by
absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and the good faith defense.
Entity liability is even harder to establish, requiring a finding of
policy or custom for compensatory damages, with no possibility of
punitive damages. Unfortunately, plaintiffs whose constitutional
rights have concededly been violated fall between the cracks in
droves, caught between qualified immunity and the good faith de74. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
75. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).

76. Id. at 815.
77. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). The Court has applied the "objectively"
reasonable standard in two Fourth Amendment cases. Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635 (1987) (FBI agent entitled to summary judgment since contours of right in
question not so clear at the time of the act as to constitute "objectively" unreasonable
behavior); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive force claim governed by
Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard).
78. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).

79. See Apostal v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1989) (filing of notice of appeal
from denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity issue ordinarily ousts District Court of jurisdiction to proceed with trial).
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fense on one hand and a narrow definition of policy and custom on
the other.
As an exercise in both pre- and post-event law, Section 1983 fails
to deliver reliable post-event relief to injured plaintiffs, and fails to
generate the fear needed to induce pre-event compliance. How
much better would it be if: (1) individual liability were more certain, with the amount of damages keyed to an individual defendant's moral fault; and (2) entity liability were to turn, not on the
mysticism of policy or custom, but on whether the government employer had in place an effective pre-event plan to assure compliance with constitutional norms-a plan that must be certified as
effective by the local Human Rights Commission.
2.

Entity Liability for Private Violation of Human Rights Norms

Unfortunately, the Court's efforts to define private employer liability are scarcely less complex.80 Four different varieties of discrimination must be processed through two different categories of
actors. Employers face potential liability for: (1) discriminatory
decisions; (2) quid pro quo sexual harassment; (3) racial, ethnic, or
religious harassment; and (4) hostile environment sexual harassment. Moreover, the individual acts giving rise to liability can be
committed by co-workers, or supervisors of varying degrees of
power. Under existing law, employers are strictly liable for discriminatory decisions.8 l Employers are also strictly liable for quid
pro quo sexual harassment.8 2 On the other hand, co-worker racial
harassment triggers employer liability only if the employer had notice and failed to take steps to end it.8 3 Similarly, co-worker hostile

environment sexual harassment requires a showing of notice in order to impose liability on the employer.8 4 When racial or hostile
environment sexual harassment is committed by a supervisor, the
courts are divided. Several courts adopt the EEOC's guidelines
which treat the actions of a supervisor as the actions of the employer, thereby establishing respondeat superior liability. 85 Others
80. See generally J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Law, 81 VA.
L. REV. 273 (1995), for an excellent survey of the area. I owe much of the following
discussion to the Verkerke article.
81. Id. at 281.
82. Id. at 282.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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demand a showing of notice to higher officials and a failure to respond, especially when the supervisor is relatively low-level.86
The bar's approaches to respondeat superior liability in the context of statutory human rights enforcement are predictable from a
post-event perspective. Victims and their advocates-including the
staff of the Commission-generally argue for a strict use of respondeat superior liability that would hold employers absolutely liable
for the human rights violations of their employees. The need for a
"deep pocket" defendant capable of compensating an injured victim, and the desire to impose incentives on employers to prevent
employees from acting improperly combine to argue for strict derivative liability.
Advocates for defendants-who are usually retained by employers-argue that employers should be liable for the human rights
violations of employees only when the employer is in some sense
morally culpable. Employer advocates argue that respondeatsuperior in the human rights contexts is fundamentally different from its
use in the tort context, since, unlike the usual negligence setting,
employers gain no economic benefit from human rights violations.
In settings where an employer did not know of the improper behavior, or otherwise contribute to it, advocates argue that it is morally wrong to saddle the "innocent" employer with the economic
consequences of an individual's morally unacceptable behavior.
Two moral wrongs, they argue, do not make a moral right.
The result is the unstable doctrinal mixture described above that
requires proof of employer culpability in some settings, but imposes strict derivative liability in others. Where the guilty parties
are on the same hierarchical level as the victim, a showing of em86. The employer liability rules can be summarized as follows:
Cannot be done by
Strict liability
Discriminatory
co-worker
when done by
Decision
supervisor
Cannot be done by
Strict liability
Quid pro quo sexual
co-worker
when done by
harassment
supervisor
Employer must have
Unclear whether
Racial, religious,
notice and fail to
strict or notice if
or ethnic
respond if done by
performed by
harassment
co-worker
supervisor
Employer must have
Unclear whether
Hostile environment

sexual harassment

strict or notice if

notice and fail to

performed by

respond if done by

supervisor
See Verkerke, supra note 80, at 283-84.

co-worker
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ployer culpability is often required, under the rubric of "notice liability." Where, however, the guilty party is a supervisory
employee, the employer is often strictly liable, regardless of moral
fault.
The net result is to shift much liability from the offending employee to the employer, while sending a mixed message to the employer about the effectiveness of preventive measures. In a sense,
the existing rules encourage a kind of "expense account" discrimination by passing the economic costs to the employer. But, as with
1983 liability, it is a post-event system without enough teeth to result in pre-event compliance. It results in the occasional compensation of a victim, but does little to induce significant pre-event
compliance. I believe that it would be more effective to always
require guilty employees to bear a significant share of the financial
cost of their behavior, while conditioning an employer's liability,
not on the vagaries of who commits the violation or whether anyone else knew of it, but on whether the employer had in place a
Commission-certified plan to prevent the violations from occurring
in the first place. If such a plan were in existence, I would free the
employer from strict derivative liability. In the absence of such a
plan, I would impose strict derivative liability for all human rights
violations.
B.

Entity Liability and the Human Rights Commission

Four recent decisions of the Commission illustrate the problem.
Each involved appalling behavior by one or more individuals.
Each quite properly resulted in a significant award of damages.
But the financial pain of the awards will not, in all likelihood, be
felt by the erring individuals. Instead, the entity employer was
treated as a "deep pocket," resulting in effective compensation of
the victim, but little real likelihood of pre-event impact. Theoretically, of course, as a result of the awards, the employers will be
more careful in the future. But, with the possible exception of one
award, the amounts involved are too small to cause real changes in
employer behavior. Moreover, when the size of the awards are further discounted by the likelihood of future liability findings, the
probability of a serious structural change in employer behavior is
quite low.
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In Polster v. ASPCA, s7 a lesbian employee of the ASPCA was
subjected to outrageous harassment and, finally, pretextual dismissal. The record of the hearing is replete with personal failure. Coworkers acted in an appalling manner. Supervisors did nothing to
stop it. And, the president signed off by engaging in a pretextual
dismissal. The substantial award of $60,000 for mental anguish and
$10,000 back pay was more than justified. But the opinion fails to
impose any financial responsibility on the cast of characters who
actually committed the violations. Instead, the ASPCA must pay
the award out of its corporate budget.
Putting aside the fact that the ASPCA is itself the recipient of
charitable donations, I believe that the award was misdirected.
The erring employees should have borne all, or at least a substantial part, of the award individually. Imposing financial sanctions on
persons who actually commit human rights violations would increase the Commission's deterrent impact, while imposing a punishment on the truly guilty party. Instead, the "guilty" individuals
suffered no financial pain.
In D'Alessandro v. New York City Bd. of Educ.,88 one of the first
women to supervise school custodians for the New York City
Board of Education was sexually harassed and, ultimately, improperly dismissed. Once again, the record teems with individual failures: co-worker harassment; supervisory inaction; and improper
dismissal. Once again, the Commission quite correctly awarded
substantial damages, both for back pay and mental anguish. Once
again, however, the erring individuals escaped all liability. The
damages must be paid from the budget of a radically underfunded
public school system. Why should the damages in cases like
D'Alessandro be even partially borne by schoolchildren? Will an
award of $20,000 really cause the Board of Education to take structural steps to change its ways? The answer is that $20,000 will not
make much of a dent in the Board's behavior, but it could be a
genuine deterrent if employees credibly believed that they would
be personally liable for at least a portion of the damages.
In Rives v. 164 23rd St. Jackson Heights, Inc.,89 a Latino male was
denied the ability to buy a cooperative apartment because of his
87. Compl. No. EM02423-02/16/90-DE, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (Feb. 15, 1995), adopted
as modified, Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Mar. 22, 1995).
88. Compl. No. E-91-0074, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (May 5, 1995), adopted, Dec. & Ord.

(N.Y.C.C.H.R. June 28, 1995).
89. Compl. No. H-92-0115, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (July 31, 1995), adopted as modified,
Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Sept. 28, 1995).
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ethnic status. The record demonstrates that the prime mover in the
discriminatory denial was the president of the cooperative. The
Commission properly awarded a modest $7,500 for mental anguish.
This time, the award was against the Board president and the coop
itself. But such a common award will almost certainly be paid by
the cooperative, thus penalizing many completely innocent tenants.
Given the modest size of the award, and the clear personal responsibility of the Board president, would it not have been more effective to forego entity liability, and place the burden on the guilty
party?
Finally, in Ruiz v. Arcade Elevator Co.,90 the complainant was
the subject of quid pro quo sexual harassment that began with a
rape at gunpoint and developed into a form of sexual bondage.
The Commission justifiably imposed an enormous sanction of
$450,000 for the extreme emotional distress caused by the grotesque behavior of several individuals. Once again, however, the
award appears directed solely against the employer. Given the failure of the employer to take minimal steps to deal with the situation, employer liability is clearly justified. But is it wise to permit
the individuals who engaged in dreadful behavior to escape individual financial sanction? Would it not be more effective to announce that individuals who behave abominably will suffer
financially? 91
C.

Two Modest Proposals

I believe that two relatively modest alterations in remedial policy
could go a long way toward increasing the Commission's ability to
influence pre-event behavior without impeding its ability to provide meaningful compensation to victims.
The Commission should distinguish between the improper conduct of individuals that caused a violation, and the derivative liability of an employer. In every case, culpable individual behavior
should result in a significant financial sanction. Only where the
injury is so significant that the financial resources of the guilty individuals cannot make the complainant whole should it be necessary
to consider employer liability. Once employer liability becomes
90. Compl. No. EM 00465-08/29/88, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (Dec. 5, 1994), adopted as
modified, Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Feb. 28, 1995).
91. The Commission has used the civil penalty provisions of its remedial armory to
achieve this result. See New York City Comm'n on Human Rights v. Park West Realty, Compl. No. MH-93-0877, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (Mar. 17, 1995), adopted as modified,
Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Apr. 26, 1995).
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relevant, either because the guilty individuals are ,unknown or financially unable to compensate the victim, employer liability
should turn on three factors. If the employer is itself morally culpable, liability should follow as a matter of course. Where, however, an employer does not bear any moral responsibility for the
events, I would distinguish between employers with Commissioncertified plans designed to prevent discrimination, and employers
who do not have such a plan in effect. The existence of a certified
plan would operate as a safe harbor for purely derivative liability.
The lack of a Commission-certified plan would result in automatic
derivative liability. The net result would be increased deterrence
of individual violations and a strong incentive for the adoption of
Commission-certified plans designed to stop discrimination before
it starts.
IV. Conclusion
The years to come may require a wrenching inquiry into whether
the Commission should continue to expend significant resources on
remedying past acts of discrimination, as opposed to seeking to
prevent future discriminatory behavior. I fear that the current
post-event enforcement model may do little more than compensate
an occasional victim, without achieving significant changes in preevent behavior. By narrowing its remedial focus to the guilty individuals, and providing an incentive for employers to adopt effective
preventive plans, the Commission would increase deterrent impact
and amplify its ability to induce employers to prevent discrimination before it occurs.

